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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term ushered in bothimportant federal law clarifications and divisive constitu-tional pronouncements. The Court performed much
work in the realm of civil procedure, doing away with Circuit
splits regarding the collateral-order doctrine and diversity
jurisdiction, and also explaining what it means to make a mis-
take for purposes of relation back—decisions sure to affect
many a federal practice. The Court also dabbled in employ-
ment law under Title VII; decided constitutional challenges to
several federal statutes, including an anti-terrorism statute;
and attempted to firm up the boundaries that inhere in the
constitutional concepts of federalism and separation of pow-
ers. But more than any of these other significant rulings, this
Term will likely be remembered for two of the Court’s deci-
sions that have easily earned “landmark” status:  McDonald v.
City of Chicago,1 in which the Court held the Second
Amendment applicable to the states, and Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,2 in which the Court held that
groups of people organized as a corporation are entitled to the
same free-speech rights as individuals. This article attempts to
illuminate the rationale and possible implications of these and
other notable civil decisions from the Court’s 2009–2010 Term.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, the Court put to rest
a disagreement among Circuits over whether “disclosure
orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for
immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.”3 In
2007, Mohawk Industries found itself waging legal battles on
two fronts. Norman Carpenter, once a shift supervisor at a
Mohawk facility, sued Mohawk on the basis that he was wrong-
fully terminated. Carpenter claimed it was no coincidence that
he was fired after voicing concerns to human resources that
Mohawk was employing undocumented immigrants. Although
Carpenter had no idea, a whole class of plaintiffs shared
Carpenter’s concerns, as Mohawk was at that time defending a
class-action suit that claimed the company had conspired “to
drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hir-
ing undocumented workers.”4 Mohawk higher-ups ordered
Carpenter to meet with Mohawk’s defense counsel for the
class-action suit, where Carpenter was allegedly asked to back-
track on his statements. Carpenter’s refusal to comply, he
claims, led to his firing under false pretenses.
The class of plaintiffs caught wind of Carpenter’s exit and
moved for an evidentiary hearing to explore Carpenter’s com-
plaint. In response, Mohawk claimed that Carpenter fabricated
his story:  the meeting with Mohawk’s counsel was in fact part
of an investigation into Carpenter’s having violated company
policy by attempting to have Mohawk hire an undocumented
worker. Meanwhile, Carpenter’s own suit against Mohawk was
entering discovery and Carpenter moved to compel Mohawk’s
production of information regarding both Carpenter’s meeting
with corporate counsel and Mohawk’s termination decision.
Mohawk argued that the information was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The district court agreed that the
information was privileged, yet granted Carpenter’s motion to
compel on the theory that Mohawk’s discovery responses in
the class-action suit waived the attorney-client privilege. The
court refused to certify its ruling for interlocutory appeal, but
gave Mohawk time to pursue appellate review through man-
damus or the collateral-order doctrine. Mohawk did just that,
and after finding no success in the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court granted review solely on the question of
whether the district court’s disclosure was immediately appeal-
able. 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for seven other justices, analyzed
the issue in traditional fashion by applying the Cohen require-
ments:  collateral rulings that do not end the litigation may
nevertheless be immediately appealable if (1) they are conclu-
sive, (2) they resolve important questions separate from the
merits, and (3) they are effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. Focusing on the third factor, the Court
noted the importance of the attorney-client privilege, but
explained that the “crucial question, however, is not whether
an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring
review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify
the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of 
relevant orders.”5 Applying this test, the Court held that the
interests served by the attorney-client privilege were ade-
quately protected by appellate courts’ ability to remedy the
improper disclosure of privileged material by vacating adverse
judgments and remanding for a new trial, excluding the pro-
tected material the second time around. As the Court
explained it, “deferring review until final judgment does not
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meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for full and frank
consultations between clients and counsel.”6
Further, to the extent the privilege guarantees the right not
to disclose information at all—as opposed to merely protecting
against its use at trial—the Court acknowledged the existence
of several litigation tools that help protect this right. A party
may seek immediate review through either an interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or a petition for a writ of
mandamus; or alternatively, parties may defy the district court’s
disclosure order and appeal any sanctions upon final judg-
ment. Also, the district court may issue protective orders to
hedge against the risk that leaked information might damage
the disclosing party outside of the courtroom. The fact that “a
fraction of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege may
nevertheless harm individual litigants in ways that are ‘only
imperfectly reparable’ does not justify making all such orders
immediately appealable as of right under § 1291.”7
In what may be the most interesting part of the opinion, the
Court once again acknowledged that the rulemaking process is
“the preferred means for determining whether and when pre-
judgment orders should be immediately appealable.”8 In fact,
this point motivated Justice Thomas’s concurrence, where he
expressed his readiness to do away with the Cohen analysis
altogether, characterizing the Court’s opinion as ironic because
of its potential to prejudice “the very matters it says would
benefit from ‘the collective experience of bench and bar’ and
the ‘opportunity for full airing’ that rulemaking provides.”9
In addition to Mohawk, the Court tackled another issue that
was causing confusion in the Circuits in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
refining the test for determining a corporation’s “principal
place of business” for purposes of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.10 In 2007, two California citizens representing a proposed
class of California plaintiffs filed suit against Hertz
Corporation in California state court, claiming violations of
California’s wage and hour law. Hertz attempted to remove the
case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Hertz argued
it was diverse from the California plaintiffs because its princi-
pal place of business was in New Jersey, where its corporate
headquarters is located and where its “‘core executive and
administrative functions’” are carried out.11 The district court
disagreed with Hertz based on its application of the Ninth
Circuit’s principal-place-of-business test. The test instructs dis-
trict courts to first determine “the amount of a corporation’s
business activity State by State” and then look for one state that
has a significantly larger amount.12 Because the district court
found that Hertz’s activity in California significantly out-
weighed its activity elsewhere, the court did not reach the sec-
ond prong of the Ninth Circuit’s test, which locates a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business where “the majority of its
executive and administrative
functions are performed.”13 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court’s analysis and the
Supreme Court granted review to
resolve the disparate Circuit
approaches.
In a unanimous decision, the
Court began by reviewing how
and why the principal-place-of-
business test came to be. The
Court related how many in
Congress had come to doubt whether the state-of-incorpora-
tion test for corporate citizenship was serving diversity juris-
diction’s policy of “opening the federal courts’ doors to those
who might otherwise suffer from local prejudice against out-
of-state parties.”14 Although simply applied, this test had two
undesirable consequences:  corporations manipulated federal
jurisdiction by incorporating in states where they did hardly
any business at all, and the resulting amount of diversity cases
caused the federal dockets to swell. Thus, in 1958, Congress
modified the diversity-jurisdiction statute so that a corporation
would be deemed a citizen “of the State where it has its prin-
cipal place of business,” in addition to the state of its incorpo-
ration.15
But, as the Court noted, lower courts encountered difficulty
in trying to locate a corporation’s principal place of business.
When a corporation’s activities were spread across numerous
states, most courts were focusing on “the nerve center”—the
place where officers direct, control, and coordinate business
activities. Contrastingly, when a corporation’s activities were
focused in a small number of states, many courts were exam-
ining where the actual business activities were taking place.
The Court noted the inherent difficulty in applying this latter
test:  “Perhaps because corporations come in many different
forms, involve many different kinds of business activities, and
locate offices and plants for different reasons in different ways
in different regions, a general ‘business activities’ approach has
proved unusually difficult to apply.”16 This difficulty quickly
snowballed into a variety of complex, multifactor tests, prone
to inconsistent application. The Court noted that this com-
plexity was likely the result of courts’ attempts to uphold the
rationale of diversity jurisdiction—to find the State where a
corporation is least likely to suffer local prejudice—but ulti-
mately, “that task seems doomed to failure.”17 This is because
local prejudice usually turns on factors that are difficult to
grasp, like corporate image, history, and advertising, as
opposed to the more measurable corporate business activities.
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diversity jurisdiction, the Court
chose the path of administrative
simplicity, holding that “principal
place of business” means “the
place where a corporation’s offi-
cers direct, control, and coordi-
nate the corporation’s activities,”
or, the corporation’s “nerve cen-
ter.”18 The Court noted three con-
siderations in support of its hold-
ing:  (1) the nerve-center test is
consistent with the diversity
statute’s language, which suggests the principal place of busi-
ness is a singular place within a state, not a state itself; (2) the
nerve-center test conserves both judicial and private resources
through administrative simplicity and greater predictability;
and (3) the nerve-center test aligns with the statute’s legislative
history, which suggests Congress intended “principal place of
business” to offer a simplistic test for lower courts. The Court
noted, however, that difficult cases will continue to arise given
today’s Internet-based business world, and that the nerve-cen-
ter test might sometimes produce a result that fails to align
with the policy of preventing local prejudice. As a parting shot,
the Court attempted to head off a few obvious opportunities
for jurisdictional manipulation, advising lower courts and par-
ties that merely designating a principal executive office on a
government form or holding an annual executive retreat in a
given location will not be sufficient evidence of principal place
of business.
In the last notable civil-procedure case, Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S.p.A., the Court cast aside the notion that a plaintiff’s
state of mind or lack of haste in amending pleadings could
affect relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.19
This case began in February 2007, when the plaintiff Wanda
Krupski tripped on board a cruise ship, fracturing her femur.
Krupski’s cruise ticket stated that “Costa Crociere S. p. A., an
Italian corporation,” was the cruise operator, and required that
any lawsuits be filed “within one year after the date of
injury.”20 The front of the ticket listed the Florida address of
“Costa Cruise Lines,” Costa Crociere’s sales and marketing
agent, and touted Costa Cruise—not Crociere—as a high-qual-
ity “cruise company.”21 Krupski’s counsel filed suit against
Costa Cruise in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Florida just three weeks before the one-year limita-
tions period expired, alleging that Costa Cruise was the cruise
operator. After the limitations period expired, Costa Cruise
repeatedly argued that Costa Crociere was the proper defen-
dant. Eventually, in July 2008, the district court allowed
Krupski to amend its complaint and add Costa Crociere as a
party, while at the same time dismissing Costa Cruise pursuant
to the parties’ joint stipulation. Costa Crociere responded by
moving to dismiss on the ground that Krupski’s amendment
did not relate back under Rule 15, and thus her claim was
untimely under the terms set out in her passenger ticket. 
The district court agreed. Although the first two elements of
Rule 15 were satisfied—the new claim arose out of the same
transaction and Costa Crociere received timely notice such
that it was not prejudiced—the court found difficulty in the
third element, which requires that the newly named party
“knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the property
party’s identity.”22 According to the district court, Krupski did
not make a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party:  Rule 15’s use of the word “mistake” did not encompass
what the court found was Krupski’s deliberate decision not to
sue Costa Crociere, a party whose identity Krupski was repeat-
edly made aware of, yet who Krupski decided to add only after
much delay. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling on two grounds. First, because the cruise ticket identi-
fied Costa Crociere as the cruise operator, Krupski “either
knew or should have known of Costa Crociere’s identity as a
potential party.” Second, because Krupski waited 133 days
after filing her initial complaint to seek leave to amend, and
then waited another month before actually amending, the dis-
trict court apparently did not abuse its discretion in “denying”
relation back.23
All nine Justices disagreed.24 Tackling the Eleventh Circuit’s
grounds one at a time, Justice Sotomayor first explained that
by “focusing on Krupski’s knowledge, the Court of Appeals
chose the wrong starting point.”25 The Court clarified that
whether a plaintiff knew or should have known the identity of
the proper party at the time of filing the original complaint
usually holds no relevance to relation back. Rather, the third
element under Rule 15 asks what the defendant knew or should
have known. The Court stated, however, that the plaintiff’s
knowledge might still be relevant to the extent it “bears on the
defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mis-
take regarding the proper party’s identity.”26 But even for the
purposes of this narrow inquiry, the Court warned that a plain-
tiff’s mere knowledge of a party’s existence does not necessar-
ily equate to the absence of mistake:  “A plaintiff may know
that a prospective defendant—call him party A—exists, while
erroneously believing him to have the status of party B.”27 The
absence of mistake is instead signified by a deliberate choice to
sue a given party, coupled with a full understanding of “the fac-
tual and legal differences between the two parties.”28 But again,
such deliberate and informed decisions are only relevant inso-
far as they affect the defendant’s state of mind.
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Up to this point, the Court’s finely drawn line between the
knowledge of plaintiffs and prospective defendants remained
visible. But the Court’s distinction became slightly muddled
when it addressed Costa Crociere’s argument that an added
defendant could “reasonably believe that the plaintiff made no
mistake” if a “plaintiff is aware of the existence of two parties
and chooses to sue the wrong one.”29 The Court responded
that the “reasonableness of the mistake is not itself at issue.”30
But if Rule 15 is only concerned with whether the defendant
knew or should have known of the plaintiff’s mistake, it would
seem the reasonableness of the mistake is relevant—the more
unreasonable the mistake, the more deliberate the plaintiff’s
decision appears, and the less likely that a prospective defen-
dant should have known that such a mistake occurred. Indeed,
this logic would be consistent with the Court’s later explana-
tion of the policy behind its ruling, “A prospective defendant
who legitimately believed that the limitations period had
passed without any attempt to sue him has a strong interest in
repose.”31 Instead, the Court’s statement suggests that, so long
as a mistake actually occurred—no matter how unreason-
able—the third element of Rule 15 will be satisfied.
This potential glitch in the Court’s opinion might be
explained in part by the facts of this particular case. The unrea-
sonableness of Krupski’s mistake may very well have been out-
weighed, in the Court’s eyes, by the district court’s unchal-
lenged finding that Costa Crociere had constructive notice of
Krupski’s complaint—a complaint which plainly stated
Krupski’s intent to sue the company that “‘owned, operated,
managed, supervised and controlled’” the cruise ship.32 In
other words, it might have been so obvious Krupski was trying
to sue Costa Crociere that even the most unreasonable actions
could not justify the belief that Krupski had not mistakenly
sued Costa Cruise.
The Court next turned to the Eleventh Circuit’s second rea-
son for holding that relation back was not appropriate:
Krupski’s lack of diligence in amending her claim. The Court
handily did away with this logic, stating that Rule 15(c) does
not include diligence as a prerequisite for relation back, and
that courts do not have equitable discretion in making the rela-
tion-back determination.33 But once again the Court offered a
caveat to its holding, noting that a plaintiff’s conduct after ini-
tial filing might be relevant insofar as it affects the prospective
defendant’s belief about whether the plaintiff made a mistake
in initially filing suit. In this case, the Court felt that Krupski’s
133-day delay in seeking leave to amend was not “sufficient to
make reasonable any belief that she had made a deliberate and
informed decision not to sue Costa Crociere in the first
instance.”34
DUE PROCESS:  SELECTIVE
INCORPORATION
This Term, the Court issued
its inevitable follow up to the
two-year old District of Columbia
v. Heller,35 where the Court held
that the Second Amendment
guarantees citizens of the
District of Columbia the right to
keep handguns in their homes.
In the sequel, McDonald v. City of Chicago,36 several residents
and activist groups filed suits in federal district court challeng-
ing city ordinances that essentially prohibited the possession
of handguns in both Chicago and its suburb Oak Park. The
cases were consolidated and the district court, although
acknowledging Heller, held it was bound by prior precedent to
conclude that such handgun bans were constitutional. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed under a privileges-and-immunities
analysis, and so too declined the opportunity to predict
whether Heller and the Second Amendment would become
applicable to the states through selective incorporation. The
Supreme Court, of course, did not pass up this opportunity.
Justice Alito, writing for the same five Justices that carried
the day in Heller,37 began with a quick dispatching of the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis:  the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause may not impose Second
Amendment limits on state governments, but its Due Process
Clause may nevertheless achieve the same feat. The Court then
reviewed selective incorporation’s central tenet, that due
process protects those rights “of such a nature that they are
included in the conception of due process of law.”38 After devot-
ing much space to the Court’s previous, eloquent attempts at
expressing the limits of this concept, the Court ultimately con-
cluded that the key inquiry is “whether a particular Bill of
Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered lib-
erty and system of justice.”39 Stated another way, whether it is
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”40 Mere
inclusion in the Bill of Rights does not alone qualify a right for
incorporation through the Due Process Clause.41 But the Court
reemphasized that, if such rights are incorporated, they are “to
be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment.”42
Applying this framework to the question before it, the
Court ultimately held that the Second Amendment was incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
In reaching this conclusion, unsurprisingly, the Court engaged
in a historical review much like the one it relied on in Heller.
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In Heller, the Court used history
to conclude that individual self-
defense is the “central compo-
nent” of the Second
Amendment;43 here, the Court
used history to show why this
right of individual self-defense is
fundamental. Going as far back
as the 17th century, the Court
found it notable that the English
Bill of Rights recognized a right
to keep arms for self-defense, and as early as 1765, Blackstone
declared this right to be fundamental. The Court explained
how 18th-century American colonists shared this point of
view, as evidenced by opposition to the King’s attempted disar-
mament of the colonies. The fundamental nature of this right
was also evident in the debates of those who framed the Bill of
Rights:  Antifederalists feared that the federal government
would disarm the people and Federalists claimed that the gov-
ernment’s constitutionally limited powers made infringement
of this important right impossible. As the Court concluded,
“Antifederalists and Federalists alike agreed that the right to
bear arms was fundamental to the newly formed system of gov-
ernment.”44 The compromise between these two groups
resulted in the Second Amendment.
In what is perhaps the most persuasive piece of historical
evidence, the Court showed how concern over the right to bear
arms was itself an impetus for ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Fast-forwarding to the mid-19th century, the
Court explained how cooling Antifederalist fears were replaced
by an emphasis on the right of self-defense. As the Civil War
ended, droves of African-American veterans of the Union
Army returned to the South only to be stripped of their
firearms—both by force of law and by physical violence. The
39th Congress took note of such injustices and responded with
the Freedmen’s Bureau bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
both of which explicitly recognized the right of all citizens to
keep and bear arms, regardless of skin color. These legislative
responses, the Court concluded, “demonstrate that the right
was still recognized to be fundamental.”45 Ultimately, Congress
felt a constitutional amendment was necessary to successfully
protect this fundamental right, among others. Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed, which was generally
“understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the
rights set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”46 As further evi-
dence of this right’s fundamental nature, the Court offered sev-
eral excerpts from congressional debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court also pointed out that, at the time of
the Amendment’s ratification, 22 of 37 state constitutions had
already recognized the right to bear arms.
Lastly, the Court declined the municipalities’ invitation to
deviate from the selective incorporation analysis it has pre-
ferred over the last 50 years. The Court made clear that a right’s
incorporation does not turn on the ability “to imagine any civ-
ilized legal system that does not recognize a particular right,”47
but whether the right is fundamental from an American per-
spective.
The Court did not make clear, however, the standard of
review that should apply to laws that burden the right to bear
arms. Nor do the small clues that did make their way into the
opinion offer any further enlightenment. At one point, the
Court agreed with and quoted from an amicus brief filed by 38
states, which noted that state and local “‘experimentation with
reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second
Amendment.’”48 The notion that “reasonable” firearm regula-
tions will be permissible does not necessarily reek of the strict
scrutiny that the Court often employs in the realm of funda-
mental rights. On the other hand, one might not read too
much into this quote, as the Court also reaffirmed what it said
in Heller, that Second Amendment rights should not be deter-
mined by “judicial interest balancing.”49
Given the importance of the issue, it is not surprising that
this case produced voluminous concurring and dissenting
opinions. Justice Scalia concurred in the Court’s result, briefly
expressing his usual doubts about the origins of substantive
due process, using most of his space to pick at the analytical
framework forwarded by Justice Stevens’s dissent. Justice
Scalia took issue with what he felt was a very subjective
approach, which favors a multifactor test over the plurality’s
historical, tradition-based approach. Justice Scalia summed up
his qualm with this approach when he observed that the “abil-
ity of omnidirectional guideposts to constrain is inversely pro-
portional to their number . . . even individually, each
lodestar or limitation [Justice Stevens] lists either is incapable
of restraining judicial whimsy or cannot be squared with the
precedents he seeks to preserve.”50 But as Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent, Justice Scalia’s historical, tradition-
based approach is also vulnerable to subjectivity. Justice
Thomas wrote a concurrence as well, in which he engaged in
his own historical account to show why it is the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause, which guar-
antees state citizens the right to bear arms.
Turning next to the dissents, Justice Stevens disagreed with
the plurality notion that, if incorporated against the states,
constitutional rights reflect identically the scope of federal
rights. In other words, he prefers the “two-track” approach.
For Justice Stevens, substantive due process, not selective
incorporation, presents the proper inquiry in this case—selec-
tive incorporation is merely one “subset” of substantive due
process.51 Thus, under his analysis, Heller’s interpretation of
the Second Amendment has no bearing on the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
guarantees state citizens the right to possess handguns in their
homes. As mentioned above, Justice Stevens proposed several
140 Court Review - Volume 46 
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factors that must be examined to answer this question, includ-
ing “[t]extual commitments laid down elsewhere in the
Constitution, judicial precedents, English common law, leg-
islative and social facts, scientific and professional develop-
ments, practices of other civilized societies, and, above all else,
the traditions and conscience of our people.”52 Justice Stevens
emphasized, however, that there is no “all-purpose, top-down,
totalizing theory of ‘liberty.’”53 In applying this approach, it
seems his principal deviation from the plurality lay in the
import he took from the plurality’s historical evidence:  “The
many episodes of brutal violence against African-Americans
that blight our Nation’s history . . . do not suggest that every
American must be allowed to own whatever type of firearm he
or she desires—just that no group of Americans should be sys-
tematically and discriminatorily disarmed and left to the mercy
of racial terrorists.”54
Lastly, Justice Breyer dissented, raising new historical evi-
dence regarding the enactment of the Second Amendment in
an attempt to cast doubt on Heller. He goes on to offer several
reasons why, even taking Heller to be correct, incorporation of
the Second Amendment is not appropriate. Much like Justice
Stevens’s approach, Justice Breyer believes that other factors,
outside of history, merit consideration for such an important
inquiry.
FIRST AMENDMENT:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Although McDonald’s incorporation of the Second
Amendment was certainly one of the landmark decisions of
this Term, it may still take a backseat to the commotion over
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.55 In this case,
the Court overruled two relatively recent campaign finance
First Amendment precedents—McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce56—
and set off a wave of criticism among journalists and legal
commentators alike.57
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, brought this case
to the Supreme Court after a federal district court ruled that
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohib-
ited the distribution and advertising of its documentary,
Hillary: The Movie. The documentary was quite critical of then-
Senator and democratic presidential nominee hopeful Hillary
Clinton. Citizens United planned to pay a cable company to
make the documentary available through video-on-demand in
the time period leading up to the 2008 primary elections.
According to the district court, this expenditure fell under the
BCRA’s provision prohibiting corporations from spending gen-
eral treasury funds on “electioneering communications”—
defined as “‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’
that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office’
and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a gen-
eral election.”58 Although
Citizens United initially argued
that this prohibition was merely
unconstitutional as applied to
its documentary, the Court felt
it was obligated to reconsider
Austin and McConnell. Thus, the
Court had to decide whether
the holdings of those cases were
correct—whether “political
speech may be banned based on
the speaker’s corporate iden-
tity.”59
The gist of Justice Kennedy’s
answer to this question was simple enough:  the First
Amendment prevents the Government from silencing a group
of speakers merely because they have taken on the corporate
form. The Court derived this conclusion from two key cases,
Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.60
According to the Court, Buckley held that limits on individual,
independent campaign spending violated the First
Amendment; Bellotti held that the First Amendment prohibits
the Government from imposing speech restrictions based on a
speaker’s corporate identity. Considering these two holdings
together, the Court determined that the BCRA’s prohibition on
independent corporate expenditures was unconstitutional:  if
Buckley guarantees individuals the constitutional right to make
independent expenditures without limit, then Bellotti guaran-
tees corporations that same right. But the Court’s opinion is
more than just reliance on prior precedent; it is clear that the
Court viewed this law as repugnant to the First Amendment
principles so important to a functioning democracy:  “By sup-
pressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit
and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and view-
points from reaching the public and advising voters on which
persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”61
Despite this tension with First Amendment principles, the
constitutionality of the BCRA’s prohibition might have been
saved if it were the least restrictive means of achieving a com-
pelling governmental interest. Austin, decided after the two
aforementioned cases, forwarded such a justification, holding
that the Government had a compelling interest in preventing
the “‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the cor-
porate form and that have little or no correlation to the pub-
lic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’”62 But accord-
ing to the Court, this anti-distortion rationale was used as a
means to avoid the ultimate implications of Buckley and
Bellotti. Thus, the Court overruled Austin as an “aberration,”63
holding that the government has no interest in equalizing the
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political playing field and that it
cannot limit political speech
based on the amount of a corpo-
ration’s wealth. The Court fur-
ther noted that it does not mat-
ter that the funds used for cor-
porate speech are accumulated
from a public that might dissent
from the corporate message,
because even individual speakers “use money amassed from
the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First
Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was
enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”64
For the Court, the danger of the opposite conclusion was
gravely illuminated by two hypothetical situations. If the anti-
distortion rationale were correct, media outlets, which are
often organized as corporations, theoretically would not be
able to express their political views during the specified elec-
tion times.65 Second, although “electioneering communica-
tions” does not encompass the print medium under the BCRA,
the anti-distortion rationale would theoretically allow the
Government to prevent corporations from printing books.
Putting these hypothetical concerns aside, the practical reality
of this case is that for-profit corporations may now spend
unlimited amounts of money to advocate for candidates in the
key months leading up to elections. As mentioned above, this
pragmatic consequence led to much ire from commentators,
and no doubt it motivated Justice Stevens’s spirited dissent,
joined by three other Justices.
Justice Stevens began by criticizing what he felt was the
majority’s lack of judicial restraint in looking beyond Citizens
United’s as-applied challenge to reconsider Austin and
McConnell. For him, the case was more appropriately resolved
by holding that the BCRA’s statutory prohibition on election-
eering communications simply did not encompass Hillary. He
took further issue with the Court’s repeated characterization of
the BCRA’s limit on electioneering communications as a total
“ban,” pointing out that members of a corporation are free to
create and fund political action committees to continue
“speaking” in favor of political candidates as a group. Also, to
the extent the majority doubted the ease with which corpora-
tions could implement and manage PACs, he noted that the
Court’s judicial activism left “no record to show how substan-
tial the burden really is, just the majority’s own unsupported
factfinding.”66
In addition to questioning the posture on which the case
was decided, Justice Stevens disagreed with the very essence of
the majority’s First Amendment analysis. The majority held
that the First Amendment guarantees corporations the same
speech rights as individuals, and that the democratic process
will benefit from their unfettered voices. Quite oppositely,







Justice Stevens argued that the First Amendment allows—and
that the principles of democracy require—this distinction
between human and corporation:
In the context of election to public office, the dis-
tinction between corporate and human speakers is sig-
nificant. Although they make enormous contributions
to our society, corporations are not actually members
of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they
may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their
interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the
interests of eligible voters. The financial resources,
legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corpo-
rations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the
electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling
constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to
take measures designed to guard against the potentially
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and
national races.67
Justice Stevens also expressed serious doubts about the
interpretation of precedent the majority used to arrive at its
decision. Most significantly, he explained that Bellotti did not
in fact hold that individuals and corporations must enjoy iden-
tical parameters of free speech, especially with regard to inde-
pendent expenditures. To the contrary, Bellotti involved a view-
point-discriminatory state statute aimed at restricting busi-
ness-corporation expenditures on a specific tax referendum,
which “plainly offended” the First Amendment.68 Not only
that, but Justice Stevens pointed out that Bellotti expressly
stated that its holding did not apply to the “‘context of partici-
pation in a political campaign for election to public office.’”69
Lastly, Justice Stevens attacked the majority’s interpretation
and under-appreciation of the compelling governmental inter-
ests forwarded by Austin. According to him, Austin’s holding
was not merely based on the interest in preventing some
potential distortion among human and corporate speakers.
Rather, that holding was justified by the broader concern over
the potential corruption of the political process that such large
independent expenditures might cause, of which the distortion
of individual voters’ voices was merely a part. Justices Stevens
pointed to the massive legislative record accompanying the
BCRA’s passage as evidence that these broad concerns have
come to fruition, with large corporate expenditures creating
the appearance of political tradeoffs. As he put it, “In an age in
which money and television ads are the coin of the campaign
realm, it is hardly surprising that corporations deployed these
ads to curry favor with, and to gain influence over, public offi-
cials.”70 The majority does not disagree that even the appear-
ance of quid pro quo corruption presents a valid justification for
the regulation of speech; at this point, the majority simply does
not see corporate independent expenditures as creating this
appearance.
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Ultimately, Citizens United displayed the stark contrast
between the views of the Court’s liberal and conservative wings
regarding both the political realities created by independent
corporate expenditures and the implications of the First
Amendment itself. Unlike Citizens United, the Court’s other
First Amendment decisions this Term were not so hotly con-
tested, but are perhaps equally fascinating. 
In United States v. Stevens, the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of a federal statute that attempted to criminalize
“the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depic-
tions of animal cruelty.”71 Robert Stevens, indicted for hawking
various types of dog-fighting videos, challenged the statute as
facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s guaran-
tee of free speech. More than anything, the Court’s response
exposed an instance of poor legislative drafting, but it also con-
tained a bit of interesting First Amendment analysis. 
Applying the overbreadth doctrine, an eight-Justice major-
ity held that the law was capable of too many unconstitutional
applications.72 The statute defined “depictions of animal cru-
elty” as “any visual or auditory depiction . . . of conduct in
which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tor-
tured, wounded, or killed” in a manner that is illegal under
state or federal law.73 The words “wounded” and “killed,” the
Court noted, did not carry any “cruel” qualifier and they do
not inherently imply cruelty. Moreover, the statute’s require-
ment that the depicted conduct be illegal under federal or state
law did not serve to narrow the statute’s focus to depictions of
animal cruelty. As the Court pointed out, there are numerous
state and federal laws concerning the proper treatment of ani-
mals that have no relation to animal cruelty. For instance, there
exist countless nuances among the lawful methods of hunting
in various states, with some states outlawing hunting alto-
gether. Thus, the statute criminalizes videos or magazines
depicting a particular type of hunting—which might be legal
in some states—if possessed or sold in a state where such hunt-
ing is not legal. Given the enormity of the hunting industry, the
Court concluded that the statute’s criminal prohibition was so
broad as to be unconstitutional.
From a First Amendment standpoint, the Court’s over-
breadth analysis is interesting in that it allowed the Court to
avoid deciding whether a prohibition that strictly applied to
depictions of animal cruelty would be constitutional.74 But
despite the avoidance of this important question, the Court did
venture to say that animal cruelty would not join the slim
ranks of speech categories that receive no protection whatso-
ever under the First Amendment, such as obscenity or inciting
speech.75 The Court acknowledged, however, that there might
be other types of speech not yet recognized by the Court that
belong in this group. The
Justices did not provide any con-
crete test for singling out these
types of speech, other than
pointing out that other cate-
gories had been “previously rec-
ognized” by the legal commu-
nity and were “long-estab-
lished.”76 In any case, animal
cruelty does not belong in this
group, and therefore any speech
restriction based on animal cruelty would be deemed content-
based and subject to strict scrutiny. It seems likely, however,
that a more narrowly drawn statute might pass strict scrutiny
on the compelling governmental interest in reinforcing restric-
tions on the underlying conduct depicted—i.e., animal cru-
elty.77
Also this Term, the Court clarified the distinction between
a First Amendment-overbreadth challenge and a Fifth
Amendment Due Process-vagueness challenge. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court considered a challenge to
the federal statute that prohibits individuals or groups from
providing “material support” to foreign terrorist organiza-
tions.78 The plaintiffs, various human-rights and nonprofit
organizations, requested declaratory relief so that they might
go ahead with efforts to support the humanitarian and politi-
cal arms of two foreign terrorist organizations. The plaintiffs
sought to provide legal training—teaching the groups how to
use international law and the United Nations to peaceably
resolve disputes—and to engage in political advocacy on
behalf of these groups. 
For their first argument, the plaintiffs contended that the
statute’s definition of “material support”—including the terms
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “per-
sonnel”—was unconstitutionally vague.79 For example, the
plaintiffs argued it was unclear whether the statute prohibited
them from providing a course on geography to members of
these foreign groups. The problem with the plaintiffs’ chal-
lenge, the Court explained, was that it relied on hypothetical
modes of support to illustrate the statute’s grayer areas, while
a person of common intelligence would clearly understand
that legal training was prohibited under the statute’s defini-
tions of “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” Thus,
even when a statute’s prohibition covers speech, and “a height-
ened vagueness standard applies, a plaintiff whose speech is
clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for lack
of notice.”80 The Court explained that such hypothetical sce-
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narios were only relevant to a
First Amendment-overbreadth
argument.
Turning next to the plain-
tiffs’ as-applied First
Amendment challenge, the
Court first noted that the
statute does not prohibit any
independent advocacy or
expression; rather, it is “care-
fully drawn to cover only a nar-
row category of speech to,
under the direction of, or in
coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be
terrorist organizations.”81 Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs
wanted to provide political advocacy that was not coordinated
with the foreign terrorist groups, they were free to do so. But
the statute did prohibit the plaintiffs from providing material
support in the form of speech to these groups. In that sense,
the statute was content-based and the Government had the
burden of showing that it was necessary to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest. 
Neither the parties nor the Court had any doubt that com-
bating terrorism is “an urgent objective of the highest order;”82
the only question was whether the statute’s prohibition on
material support—including, as in this case, support for a ter-
rorist organization’s legitimate activities—was necessary to
combat terrorism. Six Justices held that prohibiting even this
good-intentioned support was indeed necessary. Deferring to
both congressional and executive branch findings, the Court
concluded that “[s]uch support frees up other resources within
the organization that may be put to violent ends,” because for-
eign terrorist organizations do not maintain legitimate “fire-
walls” between their “civil, nonviolent activities” and their
“violent, terrorist operations.”83 The majority was careful to
note, however, that “‘authority and expertise in these matters
do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to
secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individu-
als.’”84
In addition to passing judgment on all of these federal
statutes, the Court also entertained a pair of First Amendment
cases regarding state action. In John Doe #1 v. Reed, a group of
citizens challenged Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) as
an unconstitutional burden on Free Speech.85 This case began
with the Washington government’s passage of a controversial
bill that provided expanded benefits to registered same-sex
domestic partners. The plaintiffs signed a petition to initiate a
process where Washington citizens can subject any given state
law to referendum approval. After the bill was put to a vote and
upheld, various groups that favored the bill sought to obtain a
copy of the petition, which was considered a public record and
thus available for public inspection and copying under
Washington’s PRA.
Given that these groups intended to post the petition on a
public website in a searchable format, the plaintiff signatories
challenged the PRA as unconstitutionally burdening their
political expression. Before deciding the issue, the Court noted
the unique scope of the question before it, stating that the
plaintiffs’ claim resembled both an as-applied challenge and a
facial challenge:  
The claim is “as applied” in the sense that it does
not seek to strike the PRA in all its applications, but
only to the extent it covers referendum petitions. The
claim is “facial” in that it is not limited to plaintiffs’
particular case, but challenges application of the law
more broadly to all referendum petitions.86
In an interesting juxtaposition to Citizens United—where
the Court looked beyond the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge
and considered the BCRA’s facial validity—the Court refused
the plaintiffs’ request to construe their claim as challenging the
validity of Washington’s PRA in light of its specific application
to them. 
The plaintiffs could not satisfy the burden that accompa-
nied this broader “facial” challenge, failing to show that the
PRA would be unconstitutional in every application to refer-
endum petitions. The Court acknowledged the political nature
of signing a referendum petition, but nevertheless applied an
intermediate form of scrutiny given the PRA was merely a dis-
closure requirement and not a prohibition on political speech.
Ultimately, the Court held that the disclosure requirement was
substantially related to the important governmental interest of
promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral
process. This substantial relationship lies in the fact that pub-
lic disclosure allows the public to supplement the state’s own
efforts to verify the petition’s signatures as legitimate. Further,
from a general standpoint, this governmental interest is pro-
portional to the incidental burden on speech that might result
from the fear of harassment a public disclosure of an individ-
ual’s signature could illicit. This was true for the Court given
that most bills put to a referendum vote through the petition
process do not involve such controversial issues, and thus the
usual burdens are not “remotely like the burdens plaintiffs fear
in this case.”87 Whether these specific burdens might have
constitutional significance is a question the Court left to the
district courts—for now.
The second case involving state action was Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez.88 In this case, the Christian Legal Society
(CLS), a student group at the University of California’s
Hastings College of the Law, brought a § 1983 action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from Hastings’s “admit all-
comers” student-organization policy. Hastings’s policy allows
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registered student organizations to receive certain benefits—
including possible financial assistance from the law school and
access to school facilities—in exchange for complying with
certain policies. The plaintiff student group took issue with
Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy, which the school inter-
preted to require all student groups to “allow any student to
participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in
the organization,” regardless of status or beliefs.89 CLS inter-
preted its bylaws to exclude individuals who carry religious
convictions that deviate from the group’s beliefs and to exclude
individuals who engage in “unrepentant homosexual con-
duct.”90 Given these exclusive bylaws, Hastings denied CLS
registered-organization status, but offered it most of the atten-
dant benefits anyway, save for financial support from the
school. This denial led CLS to challenge Hastings’s policy as an
unconstitutional burden on its First Amendment free-speech
and expressive-association rights.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a 5-to-4 majority, explained
that CLS’s challenge was properly analyzed under the Court’s
limited-public-forum jurisprudence, and not the more
demanding standard that is sometimes used to analyze associ-
ational-freedom cases. The Court reasoned that it would be
inconsistent to forgo the lesser scrutiny applicable to limited
public forums merely because a case involves expressive asso-
ciation as opposed to speech. This is especially true in cases
where, as here, expressive association and speech are closely
linked, and the challenged rule applies “only indirect pressure”
upon groups’ membership policies, as opposed to direct com-
pulsion.91 Thus, given that the limited-public-forum standard
controlled, Hastings had the burden of showing that its restric-
tion on access was reasonable given the purpose of the forum,
and that it was not discriminating against speech on the basis
of viewpoint. 
The Court first summarized the various justifications
offered by Hastings to support its all-comers policy, finding all
of them to be reasonable:  to ensure that “leadership, educa-
tional, and social opportunities” provided by registered stu-
dent organizations are available to all students; to allow
Hastings to police its nondiscrimination policy without inquir-
ing into student organizations’ reasons for restricting member-
ship; to encourage “tolerance, cooperation, and learning
among students;” and finally, to advance state-law goals by
choosing not to subsidize “conduct of which the people of
California disapprove.”92 The Court found the all-comers pol-
icy to be all the more reasonable given the substantial alterna-
tive channels of communication made available to CLS in spite
of their non-registered status, including access to school facil-
ities for meetings and the use of bulletin boards and chalk-
boards for advertising. These alternative channels of commu-
nication, however, cannot save what is otherwise a viewpoint-
discriminatory restriction on limited-public-forum access. But
the Court had very little trouble in concluding that Hastings’s
policy was viewpoint neutral:
“It is, after all, hard to imagine
a more viewpoint-neutral pol-
icy than one requiring all stu-
dent groups to accept all com-
ers.”93 Ultimately, given its rea-
sonableness and viewpoint
neutrality, the Court held
Hastings’s all-comers policy did
not violate the First
Amendment.
Justice Alito dissented from the Court’s opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas. Though the dissenters did disagree with the major-
ity’s dispatching of certain precedents they felt were control-
ling, their main qualm seemed to lie in the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the factual record before it. While the majority was con-
tent to analyze the constitutionality of the purported all-com-
ers policy, the dissent argued that the record exposed this pol-
icy as mere pretext, developed after litigation was initiated. For
the dissent, the proper issue was whether Hastings’s written
nondiscrimination policy constituted an impermissible burden
on speech or associational expression. If the dissent’s interpre-
tation of the facts is correct, its conclusion that Hastings’s pol-
icy is unconstitutional as viewpoint discriminative is difficult
to deny—the written policy prohibited student groups from
excluding members on the basis of religion, but not on the
basis of other, secular characteristics like political affiliation.94
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In addition to grappling with these difficult constitutional
questions, the Court resolved a novel issue regarding the time-
liness of Title VII employment discrimination suits. Though
not as philosophically stimulating as some of the Court’s other
writings this Term, it seems likely that Lewis v. City of Chicago
will not go unnoticed in employment law circles.95 This case
dates back to 1995, when the city of Chicago sought to pare
down the list of some 26,000 applicants seeking employment
with the City’s fire department by administering a written
examination. The City released the results in January 1996 and
announced that applicants who scored an 89 percent or better
would be selected at random to move forward in the applica-
tion process. This random selection process was repeated 11
times over the next six years until all of the top scorers were
selected. In March of 1997, an African-American applicant
who did not score in the top tier, and thus did not get hired,
filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission (EEOC). The EEOC granted the
right to sue, and the man filed a Title VII suit alleging that the
City’s policy of selecting only from the 89-percent-or-better
pool had a disparate impact on African Americans. The district
court eventually certified a class of 6,000 plaintiffs consisting
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of African Americans who
passed the examination but
did not score in the City’s
preferred range.
The City conceded that
the 89-percent cutoff had a
disparate impact, but it
defended on the ground that
the only actionable instance
of discrimination occurred in
January 1996, when it first
divided the applicants into
different tiers. The City argued, therefore, that even if the
March 1997 filing date of the initial plaintiff’s EEOC charge
applied to the entire class,96 the plaintiffs’ claim was untimely
under Title VII, which requires a discrimination charge to be
filed with the EEOC within 300 days of accrual.97 Thus, the
issue for the Court was “whether a plaintiff who does not file
a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice . . . may
assert a disparate-impact claim in a timely charge challenging
the employer’s later application of that practice.”98 The Court
easily, and unanimously, held that the plaintiffs had presented
a timely claim because, although “the City had adopted the eli-
gibility list . . . earlier . . . it made use of the practice of exclud-
ing those who scored 88 or below each time it filled a new class
of firefighters.”99
The practical effect of the Court’s holding is that employees
may sue under Title VII based on recently realized disparate
impacts that result from employment policies long ago
adopted. The Court acknowledged the City and its amici’s
point that this may create notable practical problems in resolv-
ing disputes, including evidence-gathering problems. But the
Court simply responded that if such consequences were unin-
tended, “it is a problem for Congress, not one that federal
courts can fix.”100
FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
While the Court was most often demarcating the fine lines
that lie between the people and government, this Term also
forced the Court to retrace—or redraw, depending on point of
view—the line between state and federal power. In United
States v. Comstock, five incarcerated individuals challenged the
constitutionality of a federal statute that allowed the
Department of Justice to keep the individuals civilly commit-
ted beyond the length of their sentences.101 The statute allows
a district court to order civil commitment of a federal inmate
if the Government can prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the individual “has engaged in sexually violent
activity or child molestation in the past and . . . he suffers
from a mental illness that makes him correspondingly dan-
gerous to others.”102 Although the plaintiffs lodged numerous
constitutional arguments in the district court, the only issue
on review was whether Congress, in creating this civil com-
mitment statute, exceeded its constitutionally enumerated
powers. Specifically, the Government petitioned the Court to
decide whether Congress’s enactment was justified under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the
power to make laws that “carry[] into Execution” its other
enumerated powers.103
Seven members of the Court agreed that the Necessary and
Proper Clause justified the statute, though only four joined
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.104 The majority laid out five
considerations in support of its holding. First, the Clause
grants Congress broad authority to legislate, which in turn
suggests a tame standard of review where the Court merely
looks “to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.”105 The Court explained that as long as this
rational relation exists, Congress, and not the courts, may
determine how closely the means will relate to the end. It is
this loose means-ends relationship that upholds the existence
of the vast majority of federal criminal statutes.
The second and third considerations more or less apply this
test. The Court summarized the history of Congress’s mental-
health-civil-commitment schemes, characterizing the statute at
issue as a marginal “addition.” In other words, this statute is
very similar to statutes that have long been recognized as ratio-
nally related to some enumerated power. Next, in perhaps the
most provocative of the five considerations, the Court tra-
versed the multi-leg route that connects this civil commitment
statute to a constitutionally enumerated power:  this statute is
“reasonably adapted” to further Congress’s “power to act as a
responsible federal custodian,” and this federal custodian
power is itself justified because it furthers “federal criminal
statutes that legitimately seek to implement constitutionally
enumerated authority.”106
Moving to the fourth consideration, the Court emphasized
the statute’s deference to the States—the statute requires the
Attorney General to inform the State where the federal pris-
oner is domiciled or was tried of the possibility of civil com-
mitment, and encourage the State to assume custody. Given
that the Court long ago rejected a State-sovereignty-based
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challenge to a less deferential civil-commitment statute,107 it
concluded there was no federalism problem here. The final
consideration driving the Court’s conclusion was the narrow
scope of the statute—applying only to individuals in federal
custody—which cuts against the concern that the Court’s
holding steps closer to creating some kind of federal police
power.
Reading the Court’s opinion, this case’s impact on federal-
ism may seem tenuous—as the majority showed, the federal
statute did not overtly tread on some area of State sovereignty.
Motivating the two dissenters, it seems, is the fear that such a
broad reading of Congress’s power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause will nevertheless chip away at the vast remnant
of power meant for the States. Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, first pointed out what he felt was a critical mis-
step in the Court’s analysis:  the Court’s failure to first make
sure that the statute’s end was “legitimate,” in other words,
aimed at furthering an express constitutional power.108 If the
end is illegitimate, the means-end relationship is irrelevant. In
this case, Justice Thomas could see no legitimate end, because
“it is clear, on the face of the Act and in the Government’s argu-
ments urging its constitutionality, that [the statute] is aimed at
protecting society from acts of sexual violence, not toward ‘car-
rying into Execution’ any enumerated power or powers of the
Federal Government.”109 Nor did Justice Thomas agree that
the statute’s constitutionality could be saved by merely looking
to other, valid criminal statutes and concluding that the statute
at issue is related to those laws, and thus is related to an enu-
merated power. This rationale, Justice Thomas wrote, “if fol-
lowed to its logical extreme, would result in unwarranted
expansion of federal power.”110
Lastly, the Court was also busy in its role as referee between
the executive and legislative branches. In Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, an accounting
firm and the nonprofit Free Enterprise Fund asked the Court
to declare the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
unconstitutional and to enjoin the Board from exercising its
powers.111 The Board, a private nonprofit corporation created
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to regulate the accounting industry
more closely, features five members who are appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The plaintiffs argued
unconstitutionality on the ground that the Board members, as
executive officers,112 were too far insulated from executive
review:  the Commission may only remove the Board members
for cause, and the President in turn may only remove the
Commission members for cause, thus diluting the executive’s
control over the Board members. The question for the Court,
then, was whether this double layer of protection was incon-
sistent with the separation of
powers envisioned by the
Constitution.
In a 5-to-4 decision, the
Court held that the
Constitution could not tolerate
the “dual for-cause limita-
tions.”113 Chief Justice Roberts
began by recalling the long-
held understanding that because it is the President’s constitu-
tional responsibility to ensure the laws are executed, he must
have the resultant “‘power of removing those for whom he can
not continue to be responsible.’”114 This power is tempered, of
course, by Congress’s ability to impose for-cause limits on the
President’s removal power when some level of independence is
desirable, i.e., when officers are performing quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial functions. The Court noted that a similar logic
has been applied to uphold for-cause limitations on depart-
ment heads’ ability to remove inferior executive officers. 
But the Court explained that when both types of limitations
come together in one chain of authority, it creates a situation
where Board members are not removable except for good
cause, and the President has no say on whether that good cause
exists. “The result is a Board that is not accountable to the
President, and a President who is not responsible for the
Board.”115 This is markedly different from the situation where
the Board members are not insulated from the Commission by
a for-cause standard, and the “President could then hold the
Commission to account for its supervision of the Board, to the
same extent that he may hold the Commission to account for
everything else it does.”116 Instead, the double for-cause stan-
dard “impaired” the President’s “ability to execute the laws []
by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct.”117
For the Court, the necessity of this holding was only height-
ened by the fear that approving two layers would lead
Congress to impose even more layers of protection in the
future. Ultimately, the Court merely severed the part of
Sarbanes-Oxley that imposed for-cause limits on the
Commission’s ability to remove Board members, as opposed to
dispatching the Board altogether.
The dissent, led by Justice Breyer, felt the Court’s opinion
was too far removed from the practical realities of executive
governance—any for-cause limitation will have a far lesser
affect than the slew of political and administrative factors that
limit the President’s power to “get something done.”118 The
dissent also attempted to poke a large hole in the principal
logic of the majority’s holding:  if the President really is pre-
vented from removing the Commissioners but for good cause








(the first layer of insulation), then, regardless of any second
layer, the President will have no power to effect the removal of
Board members if the Commission reasonably decides not to
do so on its own. In the dissent’s words, “the majority’s deci-
sion to eliminate only Layer Two accomplishes virtually noth-
ing.”119 Lastly, the dissent raised serious concerns over
whether the Court’s opinion might result in the future invali-
dation of entire administrative agencies given that severability
might not always be available as a constitutional cure.
The colossal importance of so many of the Court’s decisions
this Term is undeniable. The opinions are fascinating in and of
themselves, but, like all of the Court’s decisions, awaiting the
repercussions (good or bad) will be the most interesting part.
With decisions touching corporate freedom of speech, the
right to possess handguns in the home, terrorism, animal cru-
elty, and executive power, the coming years should be interest-
ing indeed.
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